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I. INTRODUCTION
In his provocative article, "Issue Voting" by Multimember
Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals,' Professor
John M. Rogers has provided a valuable opportunity for those of us
interested in the structural aspects of appellate court decisionmaking-especially Supreme Court decisionmaking-to step back, to
compare notes, and to evaluate an increasingly prominent proposal

*
Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. B.A. 1983,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1987, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to
thank Jim Chen, Erin O'Hara, Linda Schwartzstein, and David Skeel for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to acknowledge the generous funding provided
through the Law and Economics Center of the George Mason University School of Law.
1.
49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996).
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for institutional reform. 2 More importantly, this Colloquium provides
an opportunity to explore more deeply several anomalies associated
2.
For two prominent articles advocating replacing the prevalent practice of outcome
voting with issue voting on appellate courts, see David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing
Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Georgetown L. J. 743
(1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1993). See also Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 998 & nn.6-7
(cited in note 1). Professors Kornhauser and Sager do not argue that appellate courts should
always employ issue voting, but rather they argue that in those cases in which it becomes clear
upon deliberation that a "doctrinal paradox" exists such that the case's outcome turns on
whether the court employs outcome or issue voting, Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at
10-12 (describing the doctrinal paradox), the court should take a metavote to determine which of
the two regimes it will use to resolve the case. See id. at 30-33, 49 (describing the metavote
procedure); id. at 57 (positing that "[tihe unreflective perpetuation of case-by-case voting is a
mistake, and issue-by-issue voting is clearly the better option in many cases"). In contrast,
Professors Post and Salop posit that "while outcome-voting is the norm for appellate courts," the
regime is "deeply flawed," and issue voting is "a superior decisionmaking procedure." Post and
Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 745, 772. While both groups of authors cite a number of objections to outcome voting, Post and Salop best capture the objections when they state "outcomevoting leads to arbitrary path dependence as well as to incomplete, inconsistent, or incoherent
guidance to lower courts and future litigants." Id. at 745. See also Kornhauser and Sager, 81
Cal. L. Rev. at 43-44 (discussing the lack of guidance to lower courts under outcome voting); id.
at 45-48 (discussing the lack of guidance in future cases under outcome voting); id. at 36-39
(discussing path dependence under outcome voting).
In Ways of Criticizingthe Court, then Professor Frank Easterbrook recognized many of the
problems that these scholars associate with outcome voting, albeit in the context of discussing
the relationship between adherence to stare decisis and the problem of path dependency. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 819-20 (1982)
(positing that under a regime that adheres to stare decisis, "everything depends upon the
fortuitous order of decision"). As demonstrated in Part II, the problems that Professors Post,
Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager ascribe to outcome voting and that Easterbrook ascribes to stare
decisis are closely related. See also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309, 1349 (1995) (explaining that case-by-case
voting within single cases and adherence to stare decisis across cases prevent the requisite
number of votes to reveal cycles, thus preventing institutional inertia); Maxwell L. Stearns,
Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309, 320-23 (1995)
(describing the evolution of case-by-case voting); id. at 323-27 (describing the evolution of stare
decisis). The anomaly of path dependence arises in both contexts because outcome voting and
stare decisis are non-Condorcet-producing rules. For definitions of the terms Condorcet winner
and Condorcet-producing rule, see text accompanying notes 25-28. In contrast with Professors
Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager, Judge Easterbrook proposed a relatively more modest but
no less flawed solution to the problem of path dependency in appellate court decisionmaking.
Easterbrook proposed relaxing stare decisis, at least in constitutional cases. See Easterbrook,
95 Harv. L. Rev.at 819-20. I have previously responded to Easterbrook's proposal. See Stearns,
83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1355-56 n.138; id. at 1371 n.194. Specifically, I explained that while stare
decisis ensures that the evolution of legal doctrine will be path dependent, the standing doctrine
ameliorates path dependency's most damaging effects by presumptively grounding the critical
path of case decisions in fortuitous historical facts beyond the control of the litigants themselves. Id. at 1355-56 n.138. In turn, standing substantially limits opportunistic litigant path
manipulation. Id. at 1371 n.194. See also Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 319-20 (explaining that
in grounding the critical path of case decisions in fortuitous historical facts beyond the control of
the litigants themselves, standing promotes fair constitutional process).
Professor Rogers apparently accepts my evolutionary explanation of the standing doctrine.
See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1026 n.98 ("I agree with Stearns's ultimate point in his pieces
on standing: 'standing... limit[s] the extent to which litigants can benefit by opportunistically
manipulating the order in which issues are presented to federal circuit courts and, ultimately, to
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with appellate court decisionmaking. At the outset, I should emphasize that while he devotes a considerable portion of his article to
evaluating my scholarship on appellate court decisionmaking, 3 as
Professor Rogers himself observes, 4 none of my three articles on
appellate court voting5 contains any of the "Radical Proposals" to
which Rogers's title refers. In fact, a careful reading of Professor
Rogers's article reveals a considerable range of agreement between us.
We both agree, first and foremost, that proposals to replace outcome
voting with issue voting on appellate courts are misguided; 6 second,
that Arrow's Theorem provides a critical benchmark with which to
7
analyze and compare institutions to avoid the "nirvana fallacy";
third, that to the extent cycling is a problem in a given collective
decisionmaking body, that institution, by operating in conjunction
with another collective decisionmaking body, can reduce cycling; 8 and
finally, that the standing doctrine serves to ameliorate the problem of

the Supreme Court for consideration'" (quoting Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1351)). Rogers,
however, disagrees with my evolutionary explanation of outcome voting because he thinks that
outcome voting is in fact a Condorcet-producing rule. See note 12. As I explain in Part II,
however, the latter disagreement stems from Professor Rogers's misunderstanding of the terms
Condorcet winner and Condorcet-producing rules.
3.
See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1025-37 (cited in note 1). See also id. at 1001 n.27,
1016 n.71.
4.
Id. at 1026 n.97 ("Stearns does not make a normative assessment of competing voting
regimes for appellate courts, but rather he discusses such regimes as a part of a larger inquiry
into whether proposals to expand judicial review based upon social choice are sound").
5.
See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
Yale L. J. 1219 (1994) (using Arrow's Theorem to evaluate and compare supreme court and
congressional rulemaking procedures to evaluate normative proposals, based upon social choice
theory, to expand the scope of judicial review); 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note 2)
(providing a positive evolutionary model of stare decisis and standing and demonstrating that
while stare decisis prevents the Supreme Court from revealing intertemporal cycles, it creates
the unintended and deleterious byproduct of inviting opportunistic path manipulation, which is
significantly ameliorated by standing); 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 309 (cited in note 2) (providing
comprehensive empirical support for the social choice theory of standing, based upon relevant
history and case law).
6.
See generally Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1258-71 (cited in note 5) (providing an
evolutionary thesis of outcome voting).
7.
Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1001 n.27, 1026 n.97 (cited in note 1). See Stearns, 103
Yale L. J. at 1247-52 (cited in note 5) (using the five fairness conditions of Arrow's Theorem and
collective rationality to define the "ideal norm" that no single institution can simultaneously
satisfy); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 330-38 (cited in note 2) (describing the corollary of
Arrow's Theorem that any institution that issues collective decisions must compromise at least
one of the six criteria that Arrow's Theorem reveals cannot be satisfied simultaneously in one
institution).
8.
Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1026 (cited in note 1) ("Stearns has argued persuasively
that the problem of cycling in legislatures is alleviated by the interplay of Congress and the
courts"). See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1233-47 (cited in note 5) (discussing the "isolation

fallacy").
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path dependence in appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, by
grounding the critical path of case decisions, at least presumptively,
in fortuitous factors beyond the control of the litigants themselves.9
This level of agreement is striking, especially in an area of scholarship typified by such sharp division as that surrounding the jurisprudential implications of social choice.10
Given the extent of our apparent agreement, it might appear
curmudgeonly of me to dwell on our points of contention, which some
may view as details between two scholars who are mainly in accord.
But I hope to show in this Reply that getting to the right
outcome-that issue voting in appellate courts is a fundamentally bad
idea-if for the wrong reasons, will not do." Social choice provides a
uniquely powerful set of analytic tools, which may explain its broadbased appeal. But when basic social choice terminology is distorted,
or its basic principles applied inconsistently, as unfortunately occurs
at several points throughout Professor Rogers's article, meaningful
debate becomes difficult, and the promise that scholarship will advance our collective understanding is rendered illusory. I do not
intend to suggest that Professor Rogers's article fails to make a significant contribution. In fact, I hope to show that what I perceive to
be the article's major contribution-that the potential number of
paths that may be created in appellate courts using issue, rather than
outcome, voting is considerable-fits nicely with my broader positive
analysis of appellate decisionmaking based upon social choice.
I have three closely related, but nonetheless distinct, criticisms
of Professor Rogers's analysis. First, his claim that outcome voting is
at least as likely as unlimited motion-and-amendment voting to yield
a Condorcet winner, 2 and perhaps more so, is based upon upon a very

9.
Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1026 n.98 (cited in note 1); Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at
1355-56 n.138 (cited in note 2).
10. For a brief overview of this scholarship, see Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1225-29 (cited in

note 5).
11. Stated in terms of the theme of this Colloquium, in scholarship, unlike in appellate
court decisions, one cannot divorce the analysis of issues from the correctness of the outcome.
How one gets to an outcome is no less, and perhaps more, important than whether the outcome
is ultimately sound.
12. See, for example, Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1026 n.97 (cited in note 1) CMy problem
with Professor Stearns's argument is not with his conclusion [that outcome voting is preferable
to issue voting] but rather with his ultimately undemonstrated characterization of outcome
voting as 'non-Condorcet producing' "); id. at 1032 ("In contrast, if we focus on outcomes, then as
demonstrated above, under outcome voting even in cases like Tidewater and Kassel the clear
Condorcet winner was the side that actually won, since a majority of justices supported that
outcome over its (one) alternative"); id. at 1037 n.130 CHazarding a guess, however, I think that
C (a possibility under outcome voting) would more likely be the Condorcet winner than A (the
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significant technical misunderstanding of the terms Condorcet winner
and Condorcet-producing rule. Without agreement on the meaning of
these terms, one cannot meaningfully claim to assess the social choice
implications of various appellate court voting rules. Second, contrary
to Professor Rogers's often repeated claim in demonstrating that
unlimited motion-and-amendment voting, unlike outcome voting, is
Condorcet-producing,13 I have not once "mixed" issue and outcome
voting.14 Finally, while I agree in principle-and indeed I think this
insight to be a genuine and significant contribution to the literature
on Professor Rogers's part-that the issues in a given case can be
divided and subdivided in a considerable number of ways, thus defeating the claims that issue voting produces more stable, coherent,
predictable, or defensible results, or that issue voting renders
appellate court decisionmaking less prone to path dependency,15 I will
demonstrate that the potential number of genuine legal issues in the
cases that Professor Rogers discusses is much smaller than he
suggests. I will further demonstrate that the admittedly broader
number of genuine legal issues that Professor Rogers has identified

only possibility under issue voting), since C is the regime that in some sense is in the 'middle'
position").
13. The careful reader will no doubt observe that in the preceding two sentences, my
terminology differs somewhat from that of Professor Rogers in his characterization of my work.
I have not done this to nitpick, but rather because unlimited motion-and-amendment voting, as
I will demonstrate below, is a Condorcet-producing rule. Issue voting can include either of two
regimes: unlimited motion-and-amendment, in which case it is the same thing, or limited
motion-and-amendment, in which motions for reconsideration of rejected alternatives may no
longer be reconsidered. In the latter case, issue voting, no less than outcome voting, is a nonCondorcet-producing rule. See text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussing Condorcet-producing
rules). In this Reply, I demonstrate why appellate decisionmaking has evolved toward outcome
voting, given this choice of non-Condorcet rules. In the remainder of this Reply, I will use
motion-and-amendment and issue voting interchangeably to describe limited issue voting, as
defined above, unless otherwise specified.
14. Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1031 (cited in note 1) (The example used [based upon my
discussion of Kassel] is not one in which issue voting is used, but one in which the Court goes
back and forth between issue voting and outcome voting"); id. at 1030 n.111 (This confusion is
particularly obvious in Stearns's standing example, where the reasons are mixed with results
with abandon" (emphasis added)); id. at 1034 n.123 (Thus when Stearns intersperses votes on
Fast versus not-Flast, Valley Forge versus not-Valley Forge, and X versus not-X, he is again
mixing votes on outcomes with votes on issues").
15. In fact, I will demonstrate that issue voting, if anything, would likely promote strategic issue identification, a form of path manipulation, among deciding judges or justices, thus
exacerbating the very path dependence problem that it is in part intended to cure. See Part IV.
Compare by analogy Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1355-67 (cited in note 2) (positing that while
stare decisis renders the evolution of legal doctrine path dependent, the real problem is not path
dependence itself, but rather strategic path manipulation by litigants, which is substantially
ameliorated by the modern standing doctrine).
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furthers, rather than undermines, my overall positive analysis of
outcome voting in appellate courts.
While each of the above criticisms is important in its own
16
right, it is more important to use this Colloquium as an opportunity
to explore further the nuances of appellate court decisionmaking.
Finally in this Reply, I will demonstrate a subtle but important
additional feature of appellate court voting that further explains the
evolution in appellate courts toward outcome rather than issue voting.
Specifically, I will demonstrate that while outcome voting sometimes
thwarts the will of a majority on a given issue or set of issues,
outcome voting serves the critical purpose of promoting principled
issue identification among the deciding judges. Stated differently,
outcome voting, in contrast with issue voting, encourages judges to
identify the genuine legal issues to be decided in a given case or, in
the language of social choice, to adhere to the principle of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 17 in issue selection. It does so
by divorcing the resolution of the case from the identification of issues
or issue levels, thus encouraging writing justices to focus on the more
persuasive statements of the issues in an effort, albeit not always a
successful one, to get colleagues to join. Somewhat ironically perhaps,
outcome voting thus provides a vehicle through which courts and
litigants can seek to change over time the very anomalous outcomes
that Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager criticize it for
producing.

II. THE BASIC TERMS: THE CONDORCET CRITERION AND CONDORCETPRODUCING RULES
While I have previously provided a brief intellectual history of
both the theory of social choice and the Condorcet criterion, 8 a bit of
background is in order. Writing in 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet
discussed the paradox that underlies the modern social choice movement, namely that three individuals whose preferences are transitive
(or rational) may produce intransitive collective orderings when
trying to aggregate their preferences through some commonly em16. In addition to these thematic criticisms, I will also set out several substantial misrepresentations by Professor Rogers of my work, which appear to be the product of a lack of close
reading. See note 45.
17. For an explanation of this fairness condition from Arrow's Theorem, see notes 26, 63.
18. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1221-25 (cited in note 5) (providing an intellectual
history of social choice and collecting authorities); id. at 1252-57 (describing the Condorcet
criterion and collecting authorities).
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ployed voting techniques, including unlimited pairwise voting. 19
Condorcet was trying to devise a solution to the problem of selecting a
winner among three or more candidates or options where none has
simple majority support as the first choice among decisionmakers. To
understand his statement of the problem and his partial solution, it is
necessary to consider two sets of ordinal rankings among three
persons. In the first group, in which members possess the following
ordinally ranked preferences over alternatives A,B,C-(1) AB,C; (2)
B,C,A; and (3) C,A,B-unlimited pairwise voting produces a cycle
such that the group as a whole prefers A to B and B to C, but C to A.
In the second group, with the following preferences over the same
alternatives, in which only the preferences of person 3 have been
altered-(1) AB,C; (2) B,C,A; and (3) C,B,A-unlimited pairwise voting will produce B as the stable outcome, since it beats both A and C.
The Marquis de Condorcet proposed that in the absence of a simple
majority first-choice winner, as in both examples, the alternative that
defeats all available alternatives in unlimited pairwise contests
should prevail. 20 This rule is now known as the Condorcet criterion. 21
The Condorcet criterion suffers two apparent defects. First, it
is only a partial solution to the problem of selecting an outcome in the
absence of a majority first-choice winner among three or more options;
there are preference structures-including the first of the preference
structures set out above-that simply lack a Condorcet winner or,
stated differently, that cycle.22 Second, the Condorcet criterion does
not account for intensities of preference.23 Notwithstanding these
19. For a brief discussion of the intellectual history of social choice, and support for all of
the propositions set out in this Part, see id. at 1221-25. For a more detailed discussion of the
Condorcet criterion, see id. at 1252-57.
20. See H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1231, 1239
("Condorcet proposed that whenever a candidate obtains a simple majority over every other
candidate, then that candidate is presumptively the 'best.' This decision rule is now known as
'Condorcees criterion,' and such a candidate (if it exists) is a 'Condorcet winner' or a 'majority
candidate'"); Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting
Paradox,75 Va. L. Rev. 971, 989 n.55 (1989) ("A Condorcet winner is an alternative which beats
all alternatives in one-on-one comparisons"); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1221-25, 1252-57 (cited
in note 5).
21. See Young, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 1239 (cited in note 20); Levmore, 75 Va. L. Rev. at
989 n.55 (cited in note 20); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1221-25 (cited in note 5).
22. This turns out to be essential to the second critical term, namely Condorcet-producing
rules.
23. Thus, while in the second example B is the Condorcet winner, it may be that persons 2
and 3 are close to indifferent between all three options, while person 1 intensely prefers option
A to either B or C. If so, it is quite possible that if the voting regime allowed for commodification of preferences, the three members would select option A. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at
1276-81 (cited in note 5) (demonstrating that congressional practices have evolved in a manner
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defects, many commentators have placed great faith in the Condorcet
criterion, based largely upon the intuition that if the outcome is disfavored to an available alternative in a direct pairwise contest, majority
rule has in a very real sense been thwarted. 24 For present purposes, it
is important to consider the first defect, namely that the Condorcet
criterion is only a partial solution to the problem of aggregating collective preferences in the absence of a simple majority first-choice
winner because some sets of preference structures lack a Condorcet
winner. Social choice theorists have divided voting rules into two
categories: (1) those that are capable of ensuring that if a Condorcet
winner is available, it will prevail, referred to as Condorcet-producing
rules, and (2) those that are not, referred to as non-Condorcetproducing rules. As with the Condorcet criterion, there is a notable
defect with Condorcet-producing rules. The same two preference
structures can be used to illustrate the point.
All Condorcet-producing rules share the common feature of
25
permitting at least the same number of pairwise votes as options.
Thus, with the first set of preferences set out above-(1) A,B,C; (2)
B,C,A; and (3) C,AB-we need no less than three pairwise votes to
determine whether there is a Condorcet winner or a cycle. With only
two votes, for example-(1) B versus C (B wins), (2) A versus B (A
wins)2 6-A emerges the winner. Only by taking the third pairwise

better suited to preference commodification than appellate court voting practices); Stearns, 83
Cal. L. Rev. at 1371-84 (cited in note 2) (discussing the evolution of informal practices that
promote commodification of preferences in legislatures but not courts).
24. See, for example, Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections 158 (Kluwer,
1963) ("[The Condorcet criterion] appeals, perhaps via mathematical symmetry, to our sense of
justice.... Our own position is that our faith in the Condorcet criterion is stronger than any
other, but it is not an unqualified faith"); Levmore, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 995 n.69 (cited in note 20)
('Most writers accept almost as a given that the ability not to miss a Condorcet winner is a basic
test when evaluating a voting procedure"); id. at 994-95 ('[1]t is reasonable to proceed, as does
virtually the entire collective choice literature, under the assumption that a Condorcet winner is
very desirable" (footnote omitted)); William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A
ConfrontationBetween the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 100 (Waveland,
1982) ("This notion [that available Condorcet winners should prevail] is closely related to the
notion of equality and 'one man, one vote,' in the sense that, when an alternative opposed by a
majority wins, quite clearly the votes of some people are not being counted the same as other
people's votes"). See also Stearns, 103 Yale L.J. at 1255 (cited in note 5).
25. See William H. Riker, The Paradoxof Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on
Amendments, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 349, 354 (1958) (explaining that congressional rules that
limit the number of votes relative to the number of pending motions can mask cycles by preventing the same number of pairwise contests as options). See also Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at
1264-65 n.171 (cited in note 5); id. at 1273 n.199.
26. I am assuming that the participants vote strictly in accordance with their ordinal
rankings, which, in social choice is referred to as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and
which I have referred to as principled voting. See Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1343 n.113 (cited
in note 2). See also note 63.
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vote, in which we resurrect the option defeated in the first round, C,
and pit it against the victor in the second round, A, do we learn that
while the group prefers A to B to C, it also prefers C to A.27 Thus, a
rule that allows only two pairwise votes for three alternatives, for
example motion and amendment with no reconsideration of defeated
alternatives,28 is not a Condorcet-producing rule. As with the
Condorcet criterion, Condorcet-producing rules contain a critical
defect. In the absence of a Condorcet winner, as in this example, such
rules produce the phenomenon of cycling, such that for any proposed
alternative, another has majority support.
Outcome voting is not a Condorcet-producing rule. In fact,
neither is issue voting, as Professors Post and Salop29 and Professors
Kornhauser and Sager3 0 employ that term. In outcome voting, the
justices take but one binding vote on the most often binary choice of
outcome, affirm or reverse. In doing so, the justices may thwart the
will of a present majority of their members, or they may mask a set of
preferences that if revealed would demonstrate a cycle. This is demonstrated in both National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
Inc. 3 ' and Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,32 both of which

reveal a set of cyclical preferences when all three relevant issues are
voted upon pairwise. For ease of comparison, I will illustrate using
Tidewater and employ Professor Rogers's breakdown of that case.33
If the justices vote on Rogers's issue B--"Is a D.C. citizen a
citizen of a 'State' under Article III? (2 yes, 7 no)"-and then vote
upon Rogers's issue C--"Can Congress confer the jurisdiction of
federal courts under Article I beyond the limits of Article III? (3 yes, 6
no)"-the outcome would appear to be to strike down the federal
statute that confers jurisdiction between D.C. citizens and citizens of
a state based upon Article III. Only by taking the third and final
pairwise vote, on Rogers's issue A--"Is a statute giving federal court

27. The reader is free to confirm that applying the same voting regime to the second group
of ordinally ranked preferences will produce B, the Condorcet winner, as the outcome.
28. For a demonstration that the doctrine of stare decisis operates as a proscription
against reconsideration of defeated alternatives, thus preventing appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, from revealing preferences that cycle over time and across cases, see Stearns,
83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1350-70 (cited in note 2).
29. See Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 743 (cited in note 2).
30. See Kornhauser and Sager, 81 Cal. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 2).
31. 337 U.S. 582 (1948).
32. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
33. I have previously demonstrated the same point using Kassel. See Stearns, 103 Yale L.
J. at 1256-57 (cited in note 5); id. at 1269-71.
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jurisdiction over controversies between D.C. citizens and citizens of a
state within the constitutional power of Congress? (5 yes, 4 no)"-do
we discover that for the deciding group of justices, there are three
34
irreconcilable majorities across the three relevant pairwise contests.
Thus, using outcome voting, the Court thwarts the will of a majority
of the justices on the two underlying issues, which a majority agrees
are essential in reaching an outcome in the case. 35 And using issue
voting, without taking a final pairwise vote on the outcome of the
case, the same justices will thwart a majority on the pairwise choice
of outcome. In fact, the only way to ensure that the Court's outcome
does not defy the Condorcet criterion in both Tidewater and Kassel
would be to take a pairwise vote on each of the two underlying issues
and then take a pairwise vote on the outcome, or the reverse, take a
pairwise vote on the outcome, and then take a pairwise vote on each
of the two underlying issues. Only by taking all three critical pairwise votes is it possible to determine whether the justices' preferences
cycle or produce a Condorcet winner.
Neither defenders of outcome voting nor proponents of issue
voting have advocated such a regime,3 6 and for good reason. If the
Court were to employ such a regime, it might well identify preferences that cycle, but it would not be able to ensure an outcome. 37 That
was among the major points of my article, The Misguided Renaissance
of Social Choice,38 in which I used Arrow's Theorem to analyze and
compare rulemaking processes in Congress and in the Supreme
Court. In that article, I demonstrated that while congressional voting
rules have generally evolved toward the Condorcet criterion, in large
part because Congress has the institutional power of inertia when
34. As explained below, to fully demonstrate the point one needs to make certain assumptions about the participating justices' preference structures. See notes 41-45 and accompanying
text.
35. Professor Rogers's repeated claims that outcome voting produces the Condorcet
winner, see note 12, simply disregards the very thwarted majorities he outlines in his analysis
of Tidewater, under either a limited issue-voting or outcome-voting regime. But merely saying
that a majority has not been thwarted, or that the justices' preferences do not cycle, does not
make it so. Quite obviously using either outcome or limited issue voting, the majority that
would have achieved a contrary result under the alternative regime has been thwarted.
36. To be clear, in defending against Professor Rogers's mistaken assertion that I have
mixed outcome and issue voting, see note 14 and accompanying text and Part III, I am not
advocating that courts employ my hypothetical voting regime. Instead, I am doing the opposite,
namely, illustrating, with reference to a particular Condorcet-producing rule, why appellate
courts cannot simultaneously employ such a rule and meet their institutional obligation to
resolve all cases properly before them.
37. Compare Riker, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 364 (cited in note 25) (observing that "as
Arrow has shown, an intransitivity, once in existence, cannot be eliminated simply by juggling
the techniques of counting").
38. Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1219, 1258-71 (cited in note 5).
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faced with preferences that cycle, the Supreme Court, because it is
collectively obligated to decide cases, has evolved (along with virtually
all appellate courts) away from the Condorcet criterion.
Fortunately, to illustrate this, I did not need to consider every.
conceivable voting rule. Social choice theorists have demonstrated
that when a group of collective preferences contains a Condorcet
winner, all Condorcet-producing rules will yield that outcome. 39 As a
result, I was able to demonstrate why the Court has elected outcome
voting by considering only a couple of potential Condorcet voting
rules. 4 0 To do so, it was necessary to make a few assumptions about
the preference structures of the justices. While Rogers faults me for
making assumptions, given that we do not have complete ordinal
rankings for all justices, 41 his criticism misses the point of my analysis. It is not necessary that my assumptions about the justices' preferences in any particular case be correct for my positive analysis to be
persuasive. In fact, I have tried throughout my articles to provide a
large number of alternative assumptions for various cases, including
multiple sets of assumptions drawn from the same case or cases, some
of which may be more intuitive than others.42 Instead, we need only
39. Riker states:
There are many rules that utilize paired comparisons of alternatives to discover a
Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner exists, then all these methods come out the
same way. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, however, these rules typically produce
different results, no one of which, in my opinion, seems more defensible than another.
Riker, Liberalism Against Populism at 69 (cited in note 24). See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1255
n.127 (cited in note 5) (discussing the procedures that yield Condorcet winners). While
Professor Riker is correct that all Condorcet rules produce the same results when a Condorcet
winner is present and different results when no such winner exists, in this Reply I will
demonstrate that among the two relevant non-Condorcet-producing rules, outcome and limited
issue voting, the results of outcome voting are better in that they alone promote principled issue
identification, and thus they promote adherence to Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
See Part IV.
40. For the reason set out in the foregoing text, I could have used but one example to
prove the difficulty associated with employing a Condorcet-producing voting rule in the
Supreme Court (or any appellate court). I chose to employ more than one to flesh out a broader
range of assumptions about the participating justices' preference structures in an effort to
demonstrate the range of credible cyclical preference structures. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at
1258-71 (cited in note 5).
41. Compare Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1032 (cited in note 1) CThis is not enough
information to know which preference is the Condorcet winner, or indeed whether there is one").
42. See, for example, Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1258-71 (cited in note 5) (discussing variations on Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982),
and Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527 (1982)); Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at
1335-50 (cited in note 2) (discussing variations on Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Valley
Forge ChristianColl. v. Americans for Sep. of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)); Stearns,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 359-66 (cited in note 2) (discussing variations on Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 981 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
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recognize that if the supreme court justices ever have cyclical preferences in a given case, 43 the Court must employ a non-Condorcetproducing voting rule to resolve that case or it will cycle. But it will
not do to say that because we lack complete information we cannot
make those assumptions necessary to assess the consequences of
various voting regimes. 44 Instead, we must make multiple sets of
45
assumptions, then test them using the proposed rules.
(1986), and the general expansion of Warren-era precedents and the use of standing itself as
illustrating potential multipeakedness).
43. In their reply to Professor Rogers's article, Professors Post and Salop posit that under
specified assumptions, 9% of cases will generate cyclical preferences in a three-judge court. See
David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A
Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1069, 1081 n.35 (1996). In fact,
their simplifying assumptions understate the significance of cyclical preferences in the Supreme
Court (and in the federal judiciary generally) and the importance of such preference structures
to path manipulation. See generally Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 309 (cited in note 2). In a
system with fifty-one separate jurisdictions and with thirteen federal circuits, the possibilities
for interest groups to seize relevant facts that test the limits of multipeaked judicial preferences
is greatly enhanced. Thus, under the Post and Salop shifting-majority hypothetical in which the
questions of a lawful search technique and a peremptory challenge arise naturally in a single
case and in which the coures reversal fails to provide guidance on which of the two claimed
bases of relief is dispositive, see Post and Salop, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1071-72, a future litigant,
absent some barrier to justiciability, could readily test the limits of the coures holding by
presenting a case that turns solely upon the more favorable of the two issues. Thus viewed,
strategic path manipulation casts doubt on the authors' assumption that "all issues are
equiprobable and mutually independent," id. at 1081 n.35, and, in turn, increases the likelihood
that cyclical preferences will generate path-dependent legal doctrine. For an analysis
demonstrating the role of standing in ameliorating strategic path manipulation of legal doctrine,
see generally Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note 2); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
309 (cited in note 2).
44. This is true of economic analysis generally. The only way to test the effect of changing
an economic variable is to make certain assumptions that allow us to hold the rest of the world
constant. That, of course, does not mean that we believe the rest of the world is constant, which
is why sophisticated analysis always comes back to simplifying assumptions and relaxes them,
after completing the analysis for which simplification was necessary.
45. I should note that while Professor Rogers faults me for making assumptions, with the
exception of my Crawford and Seattle discussion, he has not criticized any of the assumptions
that I have made in any of my examples. See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1016 n.71 (cited in
note 1). In that discussion, Rogers states: "In the example, G,H,I thought that X and Y should
both be upheld; it does not follow that if X is struck down, Justices G,H,I would be unable to
distinguish the case that they disagreed with." Id. Of course, Professor Rogers is correct that
this does not follow, which is why I was careful to defend my assumption that the vote for
consistent outcome was supported by substantive analysis demonstrating that the cases were
indistinguishable for a majority of justices deciding the two cases. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at
1262-64 & nn.159-70 (cited in note 5). As before, Rogers has not attacked my actual case
analysis; indeed, he appears to have ignored it.
I should also note that while I have chosen in this Reply to emphasize my substantive
disagreements with Professor Rogers concerning the implications of social choice for analyzing
appellate court voting procedures, this should not be taken to suggest that I endorse his remaining characterizations of my work. At several points, Professor Rogers mischaracterizes my
articles in a manner that appears to reflect a lack of careful reading. I do not have space to
identify every example, but four are particularly noteworthy. First, Professor Rogers states that
"Maxwell Stearns has treated the incoherence problem in ways that suggest outcome voting is
bad." Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1025 (cited in note 1). Similarly, Professor Rogers states that
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In each of my examples, I illustrated, based upon a reasonable
set of assumptions, that if the Court employed unlimited motion-andamendment voting, a Condorcet-producing rule, it would be unable to
resolve cases in which its preferences cycled. Even if the assumptions
about the particular cases that I discuss are far-fetched, which I be-

"Stearns once called the result of issue voting the Condorcet winner, thereby strongly suggesting that outcome voting does not lead to the best result as a matter of public policy." Id. at
1027. The whole point of my discussion of outcome versus issue voting, however, was to
demonstrate why, notwithstanding the possibility that outcome voting may mask a cycle or fail
to produce a Condorcet winner, it remains the least-bad alternative among potential appellate
court voting rules. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1258-71 (cited in note 5) (explaining the
evolution of supreme court voting rules toward outcome voting). Unless one equates "least-bad"
(which of course means best available or simply "best," see id. at 1230 n.33 (describing the
nirvana fallacy)) with "bad," Rogers's assertion is unsupportable. Of course, defining X to mean
not-X makes it impossible to employ X as a meaningful standard.
Second, Professor Rogers asserts that "Stearns has referred to cases like Ydewater and
Kassel as three-remedy cases." Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1032 (cited in note 1). In fact, in the
very footnote that Professor Rogers cites for this proposition, I distinguish the same threeremedy cases that he has previously discussed, see John M. Rogers, '7 Vote This Way Because
I'm Wrong's The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L. Rev. 439, 439-42, 475 n.124
(1991); Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1266-67 n.176 (cited in note 5), including Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), from the
principal cases that I had discussed thus far in the text, including Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. at 457, Crawford, 458 U.S. at 527, and Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662, all three of which are tworemedy cases.
Third, in his effort to clarify my position, Professor Rogers demonstrates further confusion.
See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1028 n.106 (cited in note 1). He is correct that I have retracted
my assertion that the Supreme Court missed a Condorcet-winning outcome in Kassel. See
Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 321 n.49 (cited in note 2) (explaining, instead, that Kassel can be
used to demonstrate why the Supreme Court employs outcome voting, which is a nonCondorcet-producing rule). But each of his further citations to my work, following a "But see"
(which I have to assume is intended to demonstrate that I am being inconsistent), is, in fact,
fully consistent with my corrected assertion. In each of the three parentheticals, Professor
Rogers cites me for the proposition that outcome voting, a non-Condorcet-producing rule, fails to
ensure that available Condorcet winners prevail or, alternatively, may result in a masked cycle.
Those propositions not only are consistent with the corrected statement, they, in fact, make the
identical point. See id. at 321 n.49. They also happen to be correct. While I have not proved
that the Supreme Court missed a Condorcet winner in Kassel, I have explained the Supreme
Court's choice ofa non-Condorcet-producing rule. By definition, a non-Condorcet-producing rule
is one which prevents the collective decisionmaking body from either determining whether a
Condorcet-winner or a cycle is present. See generally Part II.
Finally, Professor Rogers states: "Unfortunately, in making his points Stearns treats the
incoherence problem addressed by Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and Sager as if it were a
cycling problem." Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1026-27 (cited in note 1). I do not treat the
problem of incoherence as if it were a cycling problem; instead, I demonstrate that those who
advocate issue voting have failed to recognize that the problem of incoherence is in fact a cycling
problem and one which would be exacerbated if the Court were to employ a Condorcet-producing
rule. See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1258-71 (cited in note 5) (explaining the evolution of
Supreme Court decisionmaking toward non-Condorcet-producing rules). See also Part II.
Again, this list is not exhaustive.
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lieve them not to be,46 that in no way undermines my general positive

analysis. To do that, Professor Rogers would have to argue that cyclical preferences never arise in the judiciary, an assumption that I
would suggest truly is far-fetched. 47 I should also note that while
Professor Rogers has not discussed it, I have set out an elaborate
explanation in the context of standing of why the Supreme Court,
from the early 1970s to the present, was particularly prone to having
cyclical preferences." Professor Rogers may respond that even if I am
right in my assumptions and even if the Court's preferences sometimes cycle (granted this too is an assumption, but I have little else to
go on here), it does not matter: My cycling analysis does not explain
supreme court voting rules because my analysis has "mixed" issue
and outcome voting regimes, 49 and without having done so, there is no
cycle. In fact, as the next part will demonstrate, I have done no such
thing.

46. Again, Professor Rogers has criticized none of the assumptions in any of my examples
intended to demonstrate the possibility of masked cycling in the Supreme Court. See note 42.
47. I admit to finding far-fetched Professor Rogers's notion that path dependence is significantly reduced based upon a high "co-occurrence likelihood" of related substantive issues in
given cases. See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1018 (cited in note 1). Since this hypothesis is
entirely conjectural on Professor Rogers's part, I can only respond by asserting that beyond a
very small percentage of cases in which litigants can choose the manner in which to package
issues, I would expect most issues to arise stochastically across cases. At the very least, that is
more consistent with my social choice analysis of standing, which suggests that the critical path
of case decisions, with standing in place, is presumptively grounded in fortuitous facts beyond
the control of the litigants themselves. See Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1309 (cited in note 2).
Moreover, in a federalist system like our own, the very fact that no less than fifty-one
jurisdictions can litigate most issues at any given time, and that the Supreme Court can grant
certiorari on discrete issues in particular cases, rather than having to resolve all issues that the
parties wish to have resolved, suggests that, at best, the "co-occurrence likelihood" is unlikely to
be a significant factor in ameliorating the problem of path dependency of law. See also note 43
(making a related argument in evaluating the reply by Professors Post and Salop). Instead, as I
have demonstrated in my other articles, the fact that the Supreme Court employs, by necessity,
a non-Condorcet-producing rule within and across cases means that we are inevitably stuck
with a considerable degree of path dependency of legal doctrine. See Stearns, 83 Cal.L. Rev. at
1309 (cited in note 2); Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 309 (cited in note 2). But, by presumptively
grounding the critical path of case decisions in fortuitous facts beyond the control of the litigants
themselves, the standing doctrine presumptively renders the critical path of case decisions, and
constitutional process generally, more fair.
48. Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 349-85 (cited in note 2) (explaining why the Supreme
Court was prone to multipeakedness during that period and how that phenomenon contributed
to the evolution of modern standing).
49. See note 14.
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III. ISSUE SUBSUMES OUTCOME, BUT OUTCOME DOES NOT SUBSUME
(ALL) ISSUES

At the outset it is worth noting that while Professor Rogers
accuses me at several points in his Article of mixing issue and
outcome voting to demonstrate cycling,50 to the extent that he is
correct in his analysis of Tidewater (which I will demonstrate that he
is not), he has done the same thing. Quite clearly in trying to
demonstrate that there are many ways of dividing up the issues in
that case, he has presented at the very start two alternatives, issue A,
which is a direct vote on the outcome, or issues B plus C, which
together create an opposite outcome based upon a voting path that, by
the justices' own analyses, is needed to achieve that outcome. 51 Thus,
in his very first illustration of multiple issue division in a single case,
Professor Rogers engages in the very "mixing" that he claims is improper. But surely that is a quibble. I will therefore assume that
Professor Rogers intends to attack this part of his own analysis, along
with my own, and defend us both against his erroneous attack. Little
analysis is needed to see the flaw here. Using Tidewater, Professor
Rogers has shown that there are many ways and levels at which one
can divide the issues in a given case. His critique of my analysis
demonstrates that all issues, subissues, sub-subissues, and sub-subsubissues can be deemed "issues" for purposes of employing an issue
voting rule. Thus, one can use issue voting to decide issues B and C
in Tidewater, resulting in striking the statute. Alternatively, one
might choose to subdivide either or both of issues B and C, thus producing the potential that with respect to either or both of those major
issues, there will be a cycle, such that the combination of subissues
B-1 and B-2 will produce the opposite result of a direct vote on B.
To give an example, which is admittedly hypothetical, it is
possible that issue B could be subdivided into two discrete inquiries:
(B-i) Should the judiciary employ an originalist analysis to avoid
unfair results that would follow from a literal reading of Article III's
statement of diversity jurisdiction?; and (B-2) If so, does an originalist
analysis reveal an intent to treat citizens of the District of Columbia
as citizens of a State for purposes of diversity jurisdiction? If the
answers to these two questions are both "yes," then the very anomaly
created by dividing issue A into B plus C is recreated in dividing issue
50.

See id.

51.

Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1002 (cited in note 1).
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B into subissues B-1 and B-2. An individual vote on each subissue
now produces the opposite outcome of a direct vote on the larger
issue. 52 Of course, one can go deeper still, subdividing subissue B-1
into B-i-a and B-i-b, and on and on. 53 In Rogers's analysis (other
than in his own example, in which issue A is, and then is not, an
"issue"), issues B, B-1 and B-2, and B-i-a and B-i-b, and however
many further subdivisions one cares to engage in, carry the label
"issue," while the one potential vote on issue A, namely the dispositive
vote on the question of "what is the outcome on these facts," apparently does not. 54 This appears to me to be utterly indefensible.
52. Professors Post and Salop agree. Thus, they state:
The paradoxical result under outcome voting.. . is thus just a special case of the more
general phenomenon discussed in the text. Just as voting on the single "issue" at the
highest level of the issue hierarchy-that is, outcome voting-can yield a different result
if one breaks that issue into its component subissues and votes separately on each of
those, so too can the result of the vote on any subissue change if one takes votes on each
of its components, and so on further down the issue hierarchy.
Post and Salop, 49 Vand.L. Rev. at 1077, 10 n.24 (cited in note 43).
53. It should not be necessary to devise further hypotheticals to illustrate this point, especially since Professor Rogers concedes it, stating: "Nightmares of infinite regression are conceivable:' Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1025 (cited in note 1).
54. In fairness, Professors Post and Salop recognize this problem, although they do not
offer a satisfactory solution. Thus, they state:
We have argued that the appellate court should vote separately on each issue. But this
raises the question of what determines an issue. On one extreme, critics would contend
that every case has only a single issue-whether to reverse or affirm the lower court.
According to this view, outcome voting is really just issue voting where the case involves
only a single issue. At the other extreme, it could be argued that virtually every issue
can be broken down into a discrete series of subissues. Does this mean that the appellate court must vote on every tiny step of each argument to satisfy a requirement of issue voting?
We recognize that this is a troublesome question, and we invite further work to
refine the analysis.
Post and Salop, 80 Georgetown L. J. at 772 (cited in note 2). To be clear, this critic of issue
voting does not contend that every case "has only a single issue-whether to reverse or affirm
the lower court." See id. Instead, it is my position that through careful legal analysis, appellate
judges, including supreme court justices, arrive at an equilibrium of sorts in each case in which
they derive the principal issues in that case, plus the further macro-issue, "what is the outcome
on these facts?" In the shifting majority cases (as I employ that term, see Stearns, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. at 1338 n.97 (cited in note 2) (using the term to describe cases like Kassel and Tidewater, in
which an issue vote on the two or more major case issues produces the dissenting result, and
distinguishing Professor Rogers's use of that term to describe cases like Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which two separate majorities of the Court create the case
ruling)), or those cases that present what Professors Kornhauser and Sager term the "doctrinal
paradoxi' (which is the same thing), we can infer a masked voting cycle across the macro-issue
and the principal issues by making reasonable assumptions about the preference structures of
the participating judges or justices. To avoid the institutional inertia that would result from
employing a Condorcet-producing rule to resolve such cases, the Court is forced to employ either
outcome or limited issue voting (meaning issue voting in which the justices eschew a final
determination of the macro-issue, "what outcome on these facts?"). In addition, as set out more
fully below, to prevent strategic identification of issues by subdividing issues down solely to
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Surely, just as issue B, when subdivided into B-I and B-2, remains an
issue, so too does issue A when subdivided into issues B and C. But
even if we are to accept Professor Rogers's characterization as a matter of pure semantics, it does not matter. Without engaging in the
fairly obvious sequence, the reader is free to confirm that the very
cycling that I have illustrated using issues A, B, and C can be reproduced using issues B, B-i, and B-2. As a result, even labeling issue A
as "outcome" in no way undermines my larger thesis that in the absence of a Condorcet winner, unlimited motion-and-amendment voting, a Condorcet-producing rule, in contrast with outcome voting, a
non-Condorcet-producing rule, will produce cycling. And, in fact, it
will produce cycling among issues, even with no mixing of issues and
outcomes whatsoever.
Professor Rogers may still offer two responses. First, he might
imagine that voting can only take place at one level. Thus, even if
issue B remains an "issue" after its subdivision into B-1 and B-2, it is
no longer a relevant issue; the justices are only permitted to vote on
the subissues and must allow their resolution of those subissues to
determine the outcome of B. This, in turn, poses two problems. First,
what happens if the judges choose to subdivide B but not C? They are
then clearly mixing levels in voting on one issue and two subissues.
Second, and more importantly, for Rogers to make this argument, he
must defend the very issue-voting proposals that he attacks as
indeterminate. The whole point of his critique, fairly read, is that
there are an infinite number of potential issues and issue levels. He
might further respond that in a given vertical path, we must stay at a
single level. Thus, while we can subdivide issue B into B-1 and B-2,
and then treat the combined outcome of B-1 and B-2 as controlling
issue B, we cannot then consider issue B separately, although we can
take the combined outcome of B-1 and B-2 (the new proxy for B) and
combine it with issue C, to get an outcome on issue A. If so, I would
suggest that Professor Rogers is no less guilty than Professors Post
and Salop in devising a regime for which we need a new law school
course on "Division of Issues.",5 The second problem is that even if we
employed a metarule of one-level voting, it would not be difficult to
imagine a voting cycle created as justices must now select (1) how to
define the issues and subissues, (2) the level at which to define a
create a favorable voting path, the Court elects outcome rather than issue voting from these two
alternative non-Condorcet-producing voting rules. See Parts IV and V.
55. Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1014 (cited in note 1).
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given line of issues and subissues, and (3) how to resolve
substantively the issues and subissues, after completing the outcomes
of parts (1) and (2). Any solution to the problem of cycling that multiplies the dimensions of decisionmaking, thus promoting new and
56
greater opportunities for cycling, is no solution at all.

Before leaving this Part, it is worth noting that Professor
Rogers has also accused me of mixing issues and outcome "with abandon"57 in my standing hypothetical set out in Standing Back from the
Forest.18 It is difficult to know exactly how I did this, given that
Professor Rogers provides not a single example in his article. But
since he accuses me of such a terrible thing, I feel the need to respond.
In that hypothetical, I posited that the justices would face a combination of issues, including how to decide a given case, and, following a
precedent that some believe is indistinguishable, whether the first
case governs the second. The only way that he can accuse me of mixing issues with outcomes at all (let alone with abandon) is to suggest
that the application of stare decisis is somehow not a legal issue. The
mere statement of that contention carries its own refutation. 59
IV. ANOTHER EVOLUTIONARY FEATURE OF APPELLATE COURT VOTING:
PRINCIPLED ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

In fact, the foregoing analysis reveals another critical evolutionary feature of appellate court voting, beyond, but consistent with,
those that I have previously identified. Specifically, any of the potential voting rules intended to resolve the problem of determining
the level at which issues are identified, or whether mixing of levels is

56. Professor Riker has best explained the significance of agreement on how to define
issues and issue dimensions as a means of preventing cycles: "Single-peakedness is important
because it has an obvious political interpretation. Assuming a single political dimension, the
fact that a profile. . . is single-peaked means the voters have a common view of the political
situation, although they may differ widely on their judgments." Riker, Liberalism Against
Populism at 126 (cited in note 24). Riker further observes: 'This kind of agreement is precisely
what is lacking in a cycle, where voters disagree not only about the merits of alternatives but
even where the alternatives are on the political dimension." Id. at 128. See Stearns, 103 Yale
L. J. at 1245 n.90 (cited in note 5).
57. Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1030 n.111 (cited in note 1).
58. Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1329 (cited in note 2).
59. Stated differently, determining whether case A governs case B is no less a legal issue
than how a court should resolve case B in the absence of a potentially indistinguishable precedent.
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permitted, would invite strategic identification of issues 60 that may
not be the best identification of genuine issues based upon careful
legal analysis. Ironically, perhaps, outcome voting, in contrast with
issue voting, promotes principled identification of issues necessary to
resolve cases, even while it sometimes thwarts rational resolution of
those very issues. It does so by divorcing the selection of issues from
the resolution of the case. Precisely because the outcome of the case
is based on the most often binary choice to affirm or reverse, justices
at the opinion writing stage are free to identify the issues that they
think best resolve the case under review. For that very reason, we
are able to discern an honest disagreement across genuine issues
among the justices in a given case. Also for that very reason, we can
discern the Tidewater and Kassel anomalies, namely that resolution
of the two critical issues produces a dissenting result on the outcome.
Without outcome voting, the determination of issues and issue
levels would determine the outcome of the case. As a result, to avoid
the outcome on a given issue, subissue, or sub-subissue, and so on,
justices will have a strong incentive to continue going down levels
until a path emerges (1) that gets to where they want to go, and (2)
that exhausts the credibility of further issue subdivisions on the other
side. The incentive under an issue-voting regime, oddly enough, even
if it is to allow the fair resolution of issues ultimately identified to
govern the outcome of a case, would be to thwart the identification of
genuine issues in a case. 61 Stated in social choice terms, outcome
60. Professors Post and Salop use the term "issue decomposition manipulation" to describe
the same essential phenomenon. See Post and Salop, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1075-76 (cited in note
43).
61. To avoid this apparent difficulty with issue voting, Professors Post and Salop posit the
following "primary issue" rule as a device to limit further strategic subdivision of issues in a
given case:
A primary issue on which multimember courts should vote is a question of law presented by a case that (a) is logically independent of any other questions presented by the
case, in the sense that the question can be resolved as a logical matter without reference
to any other accompanying questions, (b) is potentially dispositive of the outcome of the
case, in the sense that resolution of the question can uniquely determine the outcome of
the case, and (c) cannot be further decomposed into separate subquestions that fulfill
criteria (a) and (b).
See Post and Salop, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1078 (cited in note 43). The authors further posit that
"[t]he first two components of [this] issue decomposition rule assure that a 'primary issue' will
be a question of law on which the court can issue a 'holding."' Id. at 1079. The difficulty with
their proposed regime, however, explains the evolution toward outcome, rather than issue,
voting. As Post and Salop themselves recognize, in a considerable range of cases the deciding
appellate court judges will possess cyclical preferences, see note 42 and citations therein, such
that there exists more than one discrete method of devising statements of primary issues
meeting the first two parts of their test. In such cases, the choice of issues becomes dispositive
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voting ensures that the justices adhere to the principle of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives6 2 in identifying both issues
and issue levels. Precisely because the path of issue identification is
not dispositive of case resolution under outcome voting, the deciding
judges have a strong incentive to provide persuasive statements of the
legal issues genuinely in dispute (and, of course, how they would
resolve them). Stated differently, under issue voting, judges would
have an incentive to divide down, until a favorable voting path
emerges, while under outcome voting, judges have an incentive not to
do so, or to divide up, precisely because in setting out those issues
that are the most critical to the resolution of a given case, the judges
doing so are most likely to persuade others to vote their way. This
holds even though in such anomalous cases as Tidewater and Kassel,
but not on
a majority of the justices agreed on the definition of issues,
63
cycle.
masked
a
producing
thus
them,
resolve
how to
With issue voting, one imagines confirmation proceedings in
which the parliamentary skills of the Supreme Court nominees are as,
if not more, important than such matters as integrity, fitness for judicial service, knowledge of the law, or even jurisprudential perspective.
even under their proposed issue-voting regime. Thus, even if courts were were to employ prong
c, which Professors Post and Salop label the "stopping rule," no unique statement of issues will
emerge. Instead, litigants-and jurists-will benefit from the very strategic issue identification
(my term) or issue decomposition manipulation (the Post and Salop term) that their primary
issue rule is intended to prevent. In fact, Professors Post and Salop later recognize this very
problem:
The issue decomposition rule will produce a unique set of primary issues defined
vertically. That is, it provides a manageable "stopping rule" for the vertical issue
decomposition process. However, cases may present alternative primary issues at any
level of decomposition defined horizontally. For example, a judge presented with the
case in [an example discussed in the text] may believe that [it] should be disposed of on
grounds entirely unrelated to the constitutional questions on which we ... have focused.
Id. at 1083. The authors further recognize that in a case in which judges possess cyclical preferences, the deciding judges cannot resolve the case simply by electing to employ issue voting, but
instead, must decide upon the formulation of the governing issues, which, in turn, reintroduces
the problem of strategic issue identification. Id. As I explain in Part V, outcome voting alone
produces a collective resolution in virtually every case and a principled statement of the issues
in each case that is not dictated by strategic agenda considerations.
62. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives holds that in each pairwise contest, each
participant must choose solely based upon the merits of the alternatives presented, without
considering, for example, such extraneous matters as agenda control or the path of decisions.
See Stearns, 103 Yale L. J. at 1276-81 (cited in note 5); Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1371-84 (cited
in note 2).
63. By "masked cycle," I am referring to the fact that a non-Condorcet-producing rule prevents the requisite number of pairwise votes to determine whether the group's collective
preferences possess a Condorcet winner or instead cycle. As a result, outcome voting, a nonCondorcet-producing rule, might well mask cyclical preferences that would be revealed if the
Court instead employed unlimited pairwise voting, a Condorcet-producing rule. See Stearns,
103 Yale L. J. at 1258-71 (cited in note 5); Stearns, 83 Cal. L. Rev. at 1329-50 (cited in note 2).
See also Part II.
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Indeed, a good parliamentarian could outpace even the most brilliant
jurist by seizing relevant issues and relegating them to dustbins of
obscurity in favor of minute issues that, while not genuinely in dispute, produce a favorable voting path. 64 The final point of contention
follows directly from the foregoing analysis. While Professor Rogers is
correct that the potential number of issues in a given case, like
Tidewater or Kassel, is greater than issue-voting proponents suggest,
it is also much smaller than he suggests.
V. THE NUMBER OF GENUINE ISSUES INA GIVEN CASE IS FAIRLY
STABLE AND SMALL

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that while the potential
number of issues in a given case is larger than the two major issues at
the top of the list, for example, in Tidewater or Kassel, it is neither
infinite nor nearly as large as Rogers suggests in his analysis of
Tidewater. 5 While I agree in principle that there are numerous ways
to slice issues in a given case, surely many if not most of the issues set
out in his list are interesting questions for pedagogic inquiry, but they
are not "issues" as lawyers and judges understand that term. An
"issue," properly defined, is not any conceivable question that one can
ask about a case. In fact, issues D, E, F, G, K, and L66 are not really
issues at all. A legal issue, as I have always understood that term, is
a question or one of a series of questions the resolution of which,
individually or in combination, creates a logical progression in the
ultimate resolution of the case. For example, whether a given ruling
is fair or unfair, whether the Constitution should be broadly or narrowly construed, and the like, do not meet this fairly uncontroversial
(I think) working definition. We may be forced to admit, for example,
that a particular ruling, fair or not, is the law, or that resolving a
debate among jurisprudential approaches on constitutional interpretation, while interesting in the abstract, is simply not controlling in
Tidewater, given the clear language of Article III. Answering these

64. Alternatively, each chamber might reserve at least one law clerk position for a firstrate parliamentarian. Compare by analogy Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the
JudicialPower, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 281, 299-302 (1994) (explaining the influence of law clerks on

agenda control in the Supreme Court).
65. See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1002-04 (cited in note 1).
66. Id. at 1002-03. It is quite possible that Professor Rogers's issues M and N also belong
in this category. See id.
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questions, then, in either direction, is not necessary to the resolution
of the case, and thus these questions are not issues.
Excessive subdivision of legal issues tends in either of two
directions. Issue division can promote arcane, or exceedingly factspecific, distinctions that have the appearance of promoting an
outcome-oriented jurisprudence. Alternatively, it can produce statements of issues at far too high a level of generality, thus requiring
more arcane, or fact-specific, distinctions in future cases in which
applying a precedent drawn too broadly would produce displeasing, or
absurd, results. In fact, these two tendencies are flip-sides of the
same coin. It is precisely because a prior case was decided at too high
a level of generality that courts are often forced to devise distinctions
that, because they are overly fact-specific or arcane, fail to withstand
critical analysis. For illustrations, we need go no further than
Professor Rogers's division of issues in Tidewater.6 7 Fairly read,
Tidewater does not turn on the resolution of whether "the
Constitution [should] be interpreted to avoid unfair results" (Rogers's
issue G), or whether "words in the Constitution [should] be construed
to have consistent meanings" (Rogers's issue L).68 It is certainly no

surprise, for example, that the justices did not elect to let the answer
to Rogers's issue L control the case because if they did, Tidewater
would have threatened to become the tail wagging a far bigger and
more important dog than whether Congress can provide diversity
jurisdiction in lawsuits between citizens of a state and of the District
of Columbia. If resolving issue L controlled Tidewater, that (rather
narrow and, ultimately, not terribly consequential) holding would
have threatened to control the far more important incorporation/fundamental rights controversy, given the identical language of
69
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses.
It is not surprising that, but for the shifting majority in
Tidewater, the case instead devolved to the more manageable questions the answers to which would have resolved the case. Those, of

67.
68.

Id. at 1002-04.
Id. at 1003. It is, of course, no answer to suggest that these are issues because the

justices discussed them in their various opinions. Judges, including supreme court justices,
discuss many ancillary issues that are not genuine legal issues necessary to the resolution of the
cases that they are deciding. In any event, such a response would eschew any distinction
between holding and dictum. Accord Post and Salop, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at 1080 n.31 (cited in
note 43) (rejecting Rogers's characterization of Tidewater issues in favor of those set out in this
Reply).
69. For my recent review of this controversy and its relationship to the evolution of standing, see Stearns, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 367-83 (cited in note 2).
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course, are Professor Rogers's issues B plus C.70 As stated above, one
of the critical evolutionary benefits of outcome voting is that it encourages meaningful identification of the real issues in a case.
Precisely because the Supreme Court employs outcome, rather than
issue, voting, the Tidewaterjustices were able to agree upon the genuine legal issues (Rogers's B plus C), even while they thwarted majority preferences on those issues. Thus, while I accept that it is always
possible to devise more than one set of genuine legal issues, as I (and
I believe lawyers generally) understand that term, the number of
genuine legal issues in a given case, at least under outcome voting, is
relatively small and stable (and certainly smaller than Professor
Rogers suggests).
VI. CONCLUSION
The temptation to simplify is overwhelming for law professors,
especially given the increasing extent to which jurisprudence draws
upon other disciplines no less, and perhaps more, complex than law.
The risk in doing so, however, is equally great. We do not, for example, advance the ball by making complex subjects or analyses appear
easier than they actually are. I have used social choice throughout
my scholarship as a positive, rather than normative, tool. In part, I
have done so because social choice provides a large set of
nonefficiency-based economic benchmarks that are uniquely
conducive to providing great insights into public law.71 I have also
done so because I have long believed that true economic
analysis-indeed the more difficult economic analysis-is almost
always a positive endeavor. It is invariably easy to come up with an
analytic framework and to apply it to propose a change in existing
rules or institutions. The hard job is to identify what is missing in the
story. Although we do not agree why, Professor Rogers and I do agree
that issue voting is not a proposal worth trying. I hope in this Reply
to have used the positive tools of social choice to explain what is
missing in the analyses of those who think otherwise.

70.

See Rogers, 49 Vand. L. Rev. at__ (cited in note 1).

71. See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and
Commentary ch. 2, notes and questions (Anderson, forthcoming 1996) (describing the normative
baselines revealed by social choice and applying them to a number of public law institutions).

